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AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY At his sentencing two days later, Dahmer &id. "I take all the blame for what 1 . 
-, - - - 
did.. . . Your honor, it is over now. This OF JEFFREY WrS I has never been a case of trying to get free. 
I never wanted freedom." His lawyer told 
the press that no appeal was planned. 
What happened After Dahmer's arrest 
is of minor importance by comparison 
with what he did, which is unspeakable. 
Still, the criminal justice system did very 
well inllthis case. It handled a revolting 
set of crimes and a potentially explosive 
trial with as much civility, compassion, 
and dispatch as possible. Half a year after 
the arrest, the trial was truly over, and, 
let us hope, the healing did begn. - 
Jeffrey Dahmer was tried in Wisconsin 
- one of the fdhrteen American states 
that have no death penalty. How would 
this drama play in one of the thirty-six 
other states? He would certainly be 
charged with capital murder, and then a 
new set of horrors would begin. 
- BY SAMUEL R. GROSS On Feb. 17,1992, Jeffrey Dahmer was 
sentenced to fifteen consecutive terms of 
life imprisonment for killing and dis- ' 
membering fifteen young men and boys.' 
Dahmer had been arrested six months 
earlier, on July 22, 1991. On Jan. 13 he 
pled guilty to the fifteen murder counts 
against him, leaving open only the issue 
Excerpted with permission from an 
articlejrst published in Stitdies in 
Law, Politics and Society, Vol. 13, 
pp. 71 -1 04 (1 9931, by permission of 
the publisher, JAl Press Inc. 
of his sanity. Jury selection began two ' 
weeks later, and the trial proper started 
on Jan. 30. The jury heard two weeks of 
horrifying testimony about murder, 
mutilation and necrophilia; they deliber- 
ated for five hours before finding that 
Dahmer was sane when he committed 
these crimes. 
After the verdict, a minister who had 
counselled members of the victims' 
families told the Chicago Tribune, "I thmk 
this will be the beeinning of a healing." 
CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 
I N  AMERICA 
At the outset, it is very unlikely that 
Dahmer would plead guilty if he faced 
the death penaltji. He might still want to 
do so, at least initially; after all, at his 
sentencing Dahmer told the judge, 
"Frankly, I wanted death for myself." His 
lawyers, however, would feel ethically 
bound to advise him against pleading 
guilty to a certain death sentence. At a 
minimum, they would delay entry of a 
guilty plea for as long as possible, to 
prevent their client from taking a fatal 
step ihat he could not undo. If necessary, 
h e y  might atcernpt to get the court to 
declare him unfit to enter a plea on his 
own behalf. In addition, if their client 
were facing the electric chair (or the gas 
chamber, or lethal injection), Dahmer's 
lawyers would be much more concerned 
about preventing him from cooperating 
with the police investigation and from 
confessing fully, repeatedly, and in detail 
- as he did. 
As soon as Dahmer ~ 7 a s  arrested in 
Wisconsin, i: was clear that he would 
never be released. (Indeed, less than 
three years later, on Nov. 28, 1994, 
Dahmer was killed in prison by another 
inmate.) That would be equally true if he 
was charged across the border in Illinois, 
or in anji other death penalty state, but 
the significance of that fact would be 
vastly different. In r\?ilwaukee, it meant 
that the defense had no strong incentive 
to delay the day of judgment, since the 
only open question was ~,vIzich state 
institution Dahmer would live and die in 
In Chicago, the issue would be h o ~ v  long 
he would sunive in state custody: 
Would he live to die of natural causes or 
would he be esecuted, and if executed, 
when? In that context, Dahmer's attor- 
neys would slow the proceedings down 
as much as possible, to make sure that 
they did whatever could be done in a 
case in which their client's life was at 
stake, and to postpon'? a judgment that 
could only hasten his death. 
The trial would be delayed by any 
number of possible pre-trial motlons: 
to determine the present sanity of the 
defendant, to declare the applicable death 
penalty statute unconstitutional, to 
challenge the seizure of evidence from 
Dahmer's apartment, to suppress hls 
confessions, to challenge the composition 
of the jury panel, and so on. Some of the 
rulings on these motions might be 
appealed before trial. 
As trial approached, the defense would 
probably tq7 to obtain special procedures 
to insure the impartiality of the jury: 
a change of venue, special and time- 
consuming procedures in jury selection, 
a further long delay, and so forth. 
A capital trial of Jeffrey Dahmer 
(beginning perhaps a year or two after 
the arrest) would be a vast event. Jury 
selection alone could easily take longer 
than the sanity trial that actually oc- 
curred. In addition, the state would ha1.e 
THE FINANCIAL COST OF PURSUING A CAPITAL PROSEEUTION THROUGH TO EXEEUTION IS  HIGH. 
to prove that Dahmer committed each of 
fifteen cruel, disgusting murders. Dahmer 
could hardly deny that he killed any of 
his victims - the physical evidence was 
overwhelming - but the prosecution 
might not have an easy a time proving 
that he killed enclz of them, with "malice 
aforethought" and wit11 "premeditation 
and deliberation." Weeks, if not months, 
would be consumed reviewing his 
atrocities in detail - pictures of muti- 
lated bodies and body parts, testimony 
from pathologists and criminologists, 
descriptions of how the remains were 
found, evidence of bite marks and knife 
wounds - all to a packed press gallery, 
if not on live television. Some of this did 
happen in the sanitjr trial that actually 
took place, but not nearly as much as we 
might expect in a capital case. 
Along the way there would be numer- 
ous objections and arguments about 
evidence and procedure, which would 
fuel future appeals. Everybody involved 
- the police, the prosecutors, the judge, 
the defense attorneys, the city adminis- 
tration, perhaps the jurors, perhaps even 
some of the victims or their kin - would 
come in for their fair share of abuse. 
At the end of the trial, Dahmer would 
undoubtedly be found guilty on all or 
most counts - at the cost of millions of 
dollars and incalculable additional 
suffering. Then his sanity would have to 
be determined, as it was in real life. In 
this scenario, however, that, too, would 
be a much slower, more contentious, and 
more expensive proceeding. Finally - 
if (as I expect) he was found to be sane 
- there would be a penalty trial, prob- 
ably before the same jury.2 
The penalty proceeding in Dahmer's 
actual case was short: Nine relatives of 
victims spoke about their sorrow, pain, 
and anger, and Dahmer himself spoke 
briefly. A capital penalty trial would be 
veq7 different. The victims' relatives 
would be allowed to speak as they did, 
but much more would ride on their 
 statement^.^ As a result, the defense 
attorneys would have the right to cross- 
examine the bereaved survivors. Some of 
them might not want Dahmer to be 
executed; that division could surface. 
(On the other hand, if some of the 
victims' relatives told the jury that they 
did want him to be executed, that could 
be a basis for a later reversal on appeal.') 
In addition, the defense would 
probably present testimony from psy- 
chiatrists and psychologists who would 
describe Dahmer's obvious mental 
pathologies in elaborate detail; the 
prosecution would counter with its own 
experts. Dahmer's childhood and up- 
bringing would be scrutinized. If there is 
any pain or humiliation that his parents 
and relatives have in fact been spared, 
they would not escape it in a capital case. 
And then Dahmer would be sen- 
tenced. If he were not sentenced to 
death, there would be fury, frustration, 
recriminations, perhaps even violence. 
If he were sentenced to die, at least the 
prosecution would have achieved its goal. 
But it would not be over, not nearly. In 
that situation, unlike in the actual case, 
Dahmer would appeal. 
A CAPITAL CASE 
ON REVIEW 
Procedurally, the appellate review 
process for a death sentence is quite 
complex. First, Dahmer would be 
entitled to direct review of  he trial 
record by the state supreme courL; if he 
lost, he could petition the U.S. Supreme 
Court to review that appeal by a writ of 
certiorari. If the Supreme Court declined 
to do so, he could file a petition in a state 
court (usually a state trial court) for 
"collateral" or "post-conviction" review, 
raising issues that could not be deter- 
mined in the first round of appeals. 
A ~ypical issue at this stage is that the 
defendant's trial or appellate attorneys 
were ineffective - a claim that fre- 
quently cannot be addressed on the trial 
record alone. 
State collateral review is extremely 
variable. The initial proceeding might be 
over in hours, or it might take years. If 
Dahmer lost again at that stage, he could 
probably appeal to a state appellate court 
-perhaps even to two levels of state 
appellate courts - and then, again, seek 
discretionary review from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Finally (if he lost at 
every stage up to this point) he could 
petition for federal collateral review by 
filing a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in a federal district court. If that 
petition was denied, he could appeal to a 
federal court of appeals, and then ask the 
Supreme Court for certiorari review a 
third time. If his third petition to the 
Supreme Court was denied, Dahmer 
could file new ("successive") petitions for 
collateral review in state and federal 
courts, and (if necessary) appeals from 
the denials of these petitions. Successive 
petitions are increasingly disfavored, but 
they still succeed sometimes, at least 
temporarily. 
For the most part, any convicted 
prisoner has these same appellate 
options. But there are four differences in 
capital cases: 
See Lockhart v McCi-ee, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) 
Tennessze v Payne 111 5.c~. 2597 (1991). 
+ See Lockiznrt, note 2; Stare v Huerias, 51  Ohlo St 
3d 22,  553 N.E. 2d 1058 (1990) 
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BY ALL ESTIMATES, IT IS  EONSIOERABLY HIGHER THAN THE LOST OF A NUN-EAPITAL MURDER EONVIETION FOLLOWED BY  LIFE IMPRISONMENT. 
First,  traditionally, courts are more 
careful in reviewing claims of error in 
capital cases. There is a strong norm that 
is still widely shared (except, perhaps, by 
[he United States Supreme Court) that a 
defendant who is facing death is entitled 
LO a higher level of due process than one 
who is merely at risk of losing time or 
money.5 
Second ,  a non-capital sentence can be 
implemented before appellate review is 
complete. Some convicted defendants 
(Leona Helmsley, for example) are 
allowed to remain free on bail pending 
direct appeal, but others (Mike Tyson) 
are remanded to custody; almost all 
remain imprisoned during collateral 
review proceedings. Many defendants 
never make bail at all, and remain in 
custody from arrest through the comple- 
tion of their sentences. One way or 
another, a sentence of imprisonment may 
be over by the time the federal courts 
complete their review of a habeas corpus 
petition in a non-capital case; post- 
conviction delay favors the state. By 
contrast, appellate review of any sort is 
impossible after a prisoner is executed - 
the case is moot - so death sentences 
must be stayed during both collateral and 
direct appeals. 
Tlzii-d, non-capital defendants have 
limited access to lawyers. Every defen- 
dant has the right to an appointed 
attorney on direct appeal,%ut there is no 
such right for collateral review,' and very 
few prisoners can afford to hire lauyers. 
Prisoners with death sentences, however, 
are almost always represented by attor- 
neys throughout this process, frequently 
l ~ y  first-rate volunteer lawyers. 
Fotlr th,  capital trials and the appeals 
[hat follow are typically far longer and 
more complex than those in other cases, 
even non-capital murder trials. 
If Dahmer's capital trial followed the 
course I have described, it might take one 
to three years simply to complete the 
record for the first appeal. After that, the 
process of reading the record and writing 
the briefs might take another six months 
to a year, perhaps longer. After the case is 
briefed, the state supreme court would 
schedule oral argument. This might entail 
another six- or twelve- or twenty-month 
delay, depending on the backlog of other 
capital and non-capital cases. Eventually, 
the court would hear the arguments and 
reach a decision - after another lengthy 
delay during which the judges and their 
staff digest the small mountain of paper 
such a case generates, analyze and decide 
the issues, and come to terms with their 
own feelings about this horror. They 
could reverse Dahmer's murder convic- 
tions (or some of them), or they could 
affirm the convictions and reverse the 
sentence. Karima Wicks, former research 
director of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund's Death Penalty 
Project, estimates that perhaps half of all 
death sentences or the underlying 
convictions are reversed on initial appeal 
- a far higher reversal rate than in other 
criminal cases. Dahmer's appeal could 
present excellent grounds for reversal; 
in a case as complex and messy as this 
one would be, there is plenty of room 
for misconduct, unfairness, and error. 
Nonetheless, I expect that his death 
sentence, like those of most serial 
murderers, v~ould be affirmed. 
If the death sentence were affirrned at 
this initial review (perhaps four years or 
longer after the verdict), the process 
would continue. In general, the likeli- 
hood of success diminishes at each 
successive stage of delense that follom~s 
direct review, but the chance of winning 
something somewhere in the multi-step 
process is still substantial. Equally impor- 
tant, each stage takes time. If there is a 
reversal at any point, the case is sent back 
to an earlier point in the process - for a 
habeas corpus hearing by the federal 
district court, for a redetermination of an 
issue on appeal by the state supreme 
court, for a new penalty trial in the state 
trial court, etc. - and restarts from that 
point. Any time this happens, the state has 
to decide whether to throw in the towel 
and settle for a life sentence, or start up 
the hill again. In "ordinary" capital cases, 
the prosecutors frequently decide to give 
up the quest after an appellate setback. In 
Dahmer's case, the prosecution would 
probably never give up, in part because 
every visible event would produce a new 
wave of publicity, new anger, new re- 
criminations - and renewed suffering for 
the survivors of all the victims. 
NO EN0 IN SIGHT 
How would it end? Perhaps after five or 
ten years Dahmer would have his death 
sentence reversed and reduced to life 
imprisonment. This is the same sentence he 
in fact received, but it would not carry the 
same meaning; it would cause an explosion 
of pain and anger. Many who were satisfied 
when he was sentenced to the ma,ximum 
penalty - life - would be furious that he 
received only life when death was possible. 
They would feel devalued, humiliated, 
cheated - and it's easy to understand why, 
considering the enormous costs of achieving 
this outcome, and comparing Dahmer's 
crimes to those of other murderers who are 
occasionally put to death. 
One of the classic statements of this position is by no ineans novel .. nor 1s 11 neglible, being 
by Justice Harlan, concurling in the judgment in htel-ally  hat between life and death." See also. 
Reid v Co\~r.t, 345U.S. 1, 77 (1956): "1 do not for esample, lii'oodsot~ it N Cnrolina. S28 U.S. 
concede that ~vhatever. process 1s 'due' and 280, 305 (pluralit!. opinion) (1976'1. 
offe~~der faced ui th a [ine or pl-ison sentence ' Doliglas v C~~JOI-HI~, 372 LiS. 353 (1963). 
3ecessanly sat~slies the requiren~ents or the Murin~~ v Gini-riano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) 
constitution In a capital case. The distinction is 
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On the other hand, Dahmer might 
someday be executed. That possibility, 
presumably, is the only justification for 
this entire process. Perhaps his death 
would afford some satisfaction to the 
relatives of his victims, but could that 
satisfaction possibly make up for the 
years of gratuitous agony they would 
have endured? What they really want is 
an end. On April 21, 1992, Robert Alton 
Hams became the first person to be 
executed in California in twenty-five 
years. The day before the execution, a 
CNN television news report on the 
mother of one of the victims stated that 
"[her] grief began nearly fourteen years 
ago when her son Michael and his friend 
John Mayeski were killed by Robert Alton 
Hams. Over the years her pain has 
gotten worse instead of better, as Harris' 
execution dates came and went." 
The report quotes the mother as saylng: 
"It's time that this particular case came to 
an end. It's been inhumane and terrible 
anguish for the family members, and we 
want peace." 
And when would this final act take 
place? There is no saymg. As of Septem- 
ber 1992, the average stay on death row 
for all prisoners executed since 1976 is 
eight years and five months; for those 
executed since 1989 it is more than ten 
years, and many are on death row for 
crimes that took place twelve years ago, 
or longer, and yet they have no execution 
dates in sight.$ Probably, most death row 
inmates will never be executed. There is 
no plausible way to estimate the likely 
delay for a defendant who is sentenced to 
death in 1992 and who is among the 
minority of such defendants who are 
destined for execution. The best descrip- 
tion is that he will remain in limbo and 
his case will remain open indefinitely. 
THE H U M A N  
AND FINANCIAL COSTS 
Obviously, Jeffrey Dahmer is not 
typical of homicide defendants, and his 
trial would not be typical of capital trials. 
Most capital cases are simpler, cheaper, 
and less promiscuously agonizing. The 
scenario I have sketched shows what the 
death penalty can do to a homicide case, 
under extreme circumstances. Often 
there are fewer steps to the process - or 
they are less carefully executed - for 
reasons that are as arbitrary and unfair as 
any other aspect of the system: because 
the defendant was inadequately repre- 
sented, or, in the later stages of review, 
not represented at all. In general, cases 
that are less expensive and less excruciat- 
ing than Dahmer's to begin with are 
subject to the same range of distorting 
effects that I have described, but on a 
smaller scale. 
Although cases like Dahmer's are rare, 
they are central to any discussion of 
capital punishment. These are the crimes 
for which there is the strongest consensus 
that the punishment should be death, 
and these are the defendants who are 
most likely to be sentenced to death - 
and sometimes executed. It's important 
to consider the damage the death 
penalty can do in those situations in 
which we want it most. 
The financial cost of pursuing a capital 
prosecution through to execution is high; 
by all estimates, it is considerably higher 
than the cost of a non-capital murder 
conviction followed by imprisonment for 
life.9 But that expense - multiplied by 
ten, or twenty, or thirty executions a year 
- captures only a small fraction of the 
price of running a capital sentencing 
system. For every murderer who is 
executed there may be ten on death row 
who will never be executed, and many 
more who were convicted of capital 
murder but not sentenced to death, or 
tried for capital murder and convicted of 
lesser offenses, or charged with capital 
murder but tried or allowed to plead 
guilty to less serious charges, or acquitted 
entirely. There are thousands of such 
cases each year, and for each one we pay 
some proportion of the added costs of an 
execution - less when the process is 
aborted early, more the closer it ap- 
proaches the ostensible goal. 
Estimates of the total cost of using the 
death penalty are exorbitant. In July 
1988, for example, the Miami Herald 
reported that since 1973 the state had 
spent over $57 million on capital punish- 
ment and executed eighteen prisoners, at 
a cost of over $3.2 million a piece. In 
states with fewer executions, the costs 
per head are necessarily higher. In 1987, 
the Kansas legislature rejected the death 
penalty for financial reasons. A budgetary 
analysis prepared for the legislature 
estimated that the added expense would 
be $10 million in the first year, and at 
least $50 million before the first execu- 
tion took place several years down the 
,A luau. 
Money provides a measure of the 
magnitude of an enterprise, and in this 
case the measure is startling. Still, we are 
a rich country. We can afford to spend 
$200 million or half a billion dollars a 
year on death sentences, if we want to. 
The personal and social costs of process 
are not quantifiable, but they may be 
harder to bear. 
V h e s e  calculations are based on  NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Deaih Row 
U5.A., Spring 1993, and additional data 
prov~ded by courtesy of Ms. Kanma Wlcks, 
research director of the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund's Capital Punishment Project. The averages 
gven  exclude "voluntary executions" - cases In 
whlch a prisoner was executed zfter waiving an 
available avenue of review. 
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M. Carey, "The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars 'O See Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the 
and Sense of the Death Penalty," 18 UC Davis LAW Rehabilitative Ideal, Penal Policy and Social 
R m m ~  1221-1273 (1985); R.L. Spangenberg and Purpose, 4-8 (Yale Univ. Press: New Haven, 
E.R. Walsh, "Capital Punichment or Life 1981); Franc~s A. Allen, "Criminal Justice, Legal 
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations," 23 Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal," 501. of 
Loyola o f h s  Angeles Law Review, 45-58 (1989); Ciim. L., Criminology G Police Sci. 226 (1959). 
P J.  Cook & D.B. Slawson, The Costs of Processing 
Murder Cases in North Carolina, Teny Stanford 
Institute of Publ~c Pollcy, Duke University. 
I THE DEATH PENALTY IS  NONE OF THESE THINGS. 
VENGEANCE AND 
THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE 
Why would anyone even consider a 
death penalty regime of the sort we now 
have? 
There are two parts to the question. 
First: Why do so many people want the 
death penalty at all? Second: Having 
chosen to use the death penalty, why 
have we ended up with this Kafkaesque 
system to implement it? 
The most telling answer to the first 
question is the simplest and most natural: 
People want the death penalty for 
revenge. 
Vengeance has an ambiguous position 
in our culture. In more liberal times, 
many would disclaim revenge as a 
justification for punishment: it seemed 
too cruel, barbaric, inhumane, selfish, 
pessimistic. To many, vengeance is un- 
Christian. A liberal and civilized people 
should not seek revenge but improve- 
ment, of the offender or of society.1° Even 
now, in an increasingly conservative era 
when revenge is regularly described as a 
justification for punishment, it is re- 
named "retribution." The change is 
telling; it removes the subject from the 
description. Revenge is what the avenger 
wreaks; retribution is simply what 
happens to the wrong-doer. 
Revenge is not the only possible 
justification for capital punishment. Most 
people who favor capital punishment also 
believe that it deters homicide. Unlike 
revenge, deterring killing is a universally 
acceptable objective." This would be a 
powerful justification for the death 
penalty, if true. But it is not, in two 
senses. First (although I will not describe 
the evidence in this context), there is no 
systematic evidence that the death 
penalty for murder does deter homicide 
to a greater extent than lengthy prison 
terms. The best evidence suggests that it 
has no effect on homicide rates, and a 
few studies hint that it might increase the 
number of murders.12 Second, belief in 
deterrence is not the basis for the posi- 
tion of most proponents of capital 
punishment. In one survey, for example, 
when asked if they would continue to 
support the death penalty if it were 
proved to have no deterrent effect, two- 
thirds or more of respondents said yes.I3 
I have no difficulty understanding the 
desire for revenge, even deadly revenge, 
especially in cases like Dahmer's - a 
vicious predator who raped, tortured, 
killed, and dismembered helpless 
victims, some of them mere children. If a 
relative of a victim did kill him, I would 
feel a great deal of sympathy for that 
relative, and little, if any, for Dahmer. 
But we do not allow relatives to avenge 
their dead, not even in egregious cases, 
and state-administered capital punish- 
ment is a poor vehicle for revenge.'+ 
A personal act of vengeance, properly 
executed, is timely, passionate, and 
personal - the grieving father tracking 
down and killing the killer of his child. 
The death penalty, in this society, is none 
of these things. It is slow, passionless, 
and impersonal, unreliable and rare. And 
that brings us to the answer to the second 
question: Why do we have the bizarre 
death penalty apparatus I have described? 
Part of the problem is that we feel that 
we have to take great care to insure that 
the death penalty is used fairly. The most 
basic concern is to avoid errors. Nobody 
wants a part in executing the wrong 
person, or even the right person if the 
judgment is marred by serious mistakes 
on issues of intent or sanity. 
If capital punishment were restricted 
to serial killers with bodies in the freezer, 
the question of possible errors might not 
be very troubling. Obviously Jeffrey 
Dahmer (or John Gacy or Ted Bundy) 
acted with malice and premeditation, 
without provocation, and under no threat 
of personal danger. Moreover, most 
people probably don't care whether a 
serial murderer is insane; they want him 
killed just the same. But our death 
penalty laws are not restricted to the rare, 
extreme, and bizarre murders. A capital 
trial is much more likely to involve an 
addict who kills a checkout clerk at a 
convenience store. In that context, the 
jury's judgment may well turn on 
uncertain and disputed evidence, or on 
slippery interpretations. 
There is no obvious best way to avoid 
errors in criminal prosecutions. Our 
American adversarial system of adjudica- 
tion, for better or worse, relies heavily on 
procedural devices to guarantee fairness 
and accuracy.15 An accused has no 
particular right to a careful and thorough 
investigation by the police. He does, 
however, have rights to counsel, to 
remain silent, to privacy, to an impartial 
jury, to confront his accusers, to present 
a defense, and so on. These rights may be 
implemented by judicial action at every 
stage - pre-trial, trial, post-trial, appeal, 
collateral review. All this takes time, but 
we can hardly deny these rights to those 
defendants who stand to lose the most 
simply because time (for a change) is on 
their side. In the heat of the moment in 
some cases we may want to drag the 
culprit straight out and hang him. But 
when that passion subsides we will still 
believe that those the state wishes to kill 
are entitled to at least the same level of 
' '  See, e.g., P.C. Ellsworth and L. Ross, "Public 
Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close 
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and 
Retentionis~s," 29 Clime and Delinquency, 116- 
16 (1983); and Alec Gallup and Frank Newport, 
"Death Penalty Support Remains Strong, But 
Most Felt Unfairly Applied," The Gallup Poll News 
Setvice, Vol 56 No. 81, 3 (June 6,  1991). 
l2 R. Hood, The Death Penalty: A U'o'orldwide 
Pelspecrive, 117-148 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989); R. Lempert, "Desert and Deterrence: 
An Assement of the Moral Bases of the Case for 
Capital Punishment." 79 Michigan Law Review 
1776-1231 (1981); Zimring and Hawkins, 
Capital Punishment and the Alneiican Agenda, 
167-186 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986); and W,!. Bowers and G.L. Pierce, 
"Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect 
of Executions," 26 Crime and Delinquency, 511 
(1980). 
l3  Ellsworth and Ross (cited in note 11). 
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THE SYSTEM DOES PRODUCE WHAT THE PUBLIC OEMANOS: 
procedural care and due process as other 
defendants - and probably more. 
Factual errors are not the only prob- 
lem. Through the 19805, nearly 20,000 
people were arrested for homicides 
annually; of these, fewer than 2 percent 
were sentenced to death. Were these 200 
to 300 people really the most heinous 
murderers we caught? Or were they 
chosen by chance, or, worse, because of 
some impermissible criteria - race, 
poverty, the race of their victims, and so 
forth? Walter Bems, an articulate advo- 
cate for capital punishment, has summa- 
rized the problem well: However strongly 
one may favor the death penalty in 
principle, its propriety in practice "depends 
on our ability to restrict its use to the worst 
of our criminals and to impose it in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion."16 
The dangers of arbitrariness and 
discrimination are not restricted to 
capital punishment, but they are at their 
worst in this context, for three reasons. 
InJreq~tency. Again, if we limited the 
death penalty to serial murders, we could 
probably do a decent job of identifying 
capital homicides and imposing death 
sentences uniformly. Instead, most 
death-penalty states select a small 
number of capital cases from a large and 
amorphous range of death-eligble 
crimes. Many are at risk, but few are 
condemned. As a result, every potentially 
capital case is subject to a series of 
discretionary choices - by the police, 
the prosecutor, the judge, the jury - 
each of which might be based on hap- 
penstance or bias. 
Salience. The death penalty is a 
troubling and divisive institution. A 
substantial minority (18 percent in a 
1991 Gallup and Newport poll) still 
oppose it in principle, and those who 
favor the death penalty are divided about 
when and how to use it. As a result, life 
or death decisions may turn on the identity 
of the prosecutor, the jurors, or the judge, 
or on their reactions to peculiar, incidental 
facts. For example, the most memorable 
fact of Robert Alton Harris's crimes is that 
after he killed his two teenage victims, 
he ate the hamburgers they had bought at 
Jack-in-the-Box. This incident was 
mentioned repeatedly in news stories 
throughout the fourteen-year life of the 
case; it almost certainly influenced the jury 
that sentenced him. How much does this 
five-second sound bite tell us about Hams? 
Would he have deserved death any less if 
he had eaten lunch before he kidnapped 
his hapless victims? 
Juries. Jury sentencing is uncommon 
for non-capital crimes in the United 
States, but it is the rule in capital cases. 
In other words, the hardest and most 
discretionary sentencing decisions are 
made by ad-hoc panels of one-time lay 
decision makers - hardly a process 
calculated to minimize arbitrariness and 
discrimination. And yet we believe that 
jury sentencing plays an important rule 
in legitimating the death penalty, and 
ensuring that its use reflects community 
values." 
The sum of the effects of these forces 
is a depressing fact: Consistency in 
criminal sentencing is least likely in 
decisions on life and death, where it 
matters most. Not surprisingly, there is 
a great deal of evidence that race and 
chance both play large roles in determin- 
ing who is sentenced to death in the 
United States, and who is spared.18 
Consider two stylized capital punish- 
ment systems. System I: We grab every 
person who commits a murder and 
quickly kill them. System 11: We (equally 
efficiently) grab every person who 
commits a murder and put them into a 
holding pen. After five years, we empty 
out the pen and decide which of the 
inmates to kill. System I has a harsh, Old 
Testament quality, but if you want 
revenge, it might seem right. The execu- 
tion is a direct response to the murder. 
System 11, however, is a closer approxi- 
mation of what we actually do, and must 
do; but in this version the task is very 
different. It's not just the wait, it's the 
process of choosing who will die and who 
will live: Death is now served by a 
repetitive, comparative, untrustworthy, 
selection procedure. 
Judges and legislators are aware of this 
arbitrariness and potential discrimina- 
tion. They have tried to curb these 
problems by creating an array of elabo- 
rate procedural devices such as trial-like 
capital penalty hearings and post-verdict 
"proportionality review" of death sen- 
tences. These procedures may or may not 
have any effect - they certainly are not 
entirely successful - but they do take 
time. Moreover, the knowledge that 
death row prisoners may have been 
unfairly or arbitrarily singled out makes 
judges move more carefully and less 
expeditiously on all other procedural 
points as well. 
Perhaps executions could be speeded 
up somewhat. I can imagine that we 
could contrive to conduct most of them 
within five years of arrest, rather than 
ten. We can't go much faster than that 
without dismantling the procedural 
structure of our system of criminal justice 
- a structure that was created largely to 
protect defendants. This cuts strongly 
against the grain; it will not happen. 
Given that limitation, there is little 
incentive to accelerate the process at all, 
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A WIDELY AVAllABlE DEATH PENALTY THAT IS  RARELY CARRIED OUT. 
since even a fi.ve-year delay is enough to 
gut the meaning of revenge. The man 
you wanted to kill was  he abusive 
robber, high on crack, who pistol 
whipped and shot two customers at a 
Seven-Eleven store in 1984. Instead, in 
1990, the state electrocutes a balding, 
religious model prisoner in a neat blue 
denim uniform. 
The processes I have described feed 
cln themselves, and on each other. To 
reduce errors in capital cases we generate 
new procedures; these procedures must 
be followed in future cases, which 
increases delay. As executions are 
delayed, they are increasingly drained of 
content as acts of revenge; as a result, it 
is increasingly easy to accept further 
delays, or to forego the killings alto- 
gether. As delays and reversals become 
more common, executions become 
increasingly rare; :he more rare they are, 
the more likely it is that those who are 
killed will be the victims of bias or 
caprice - and the more distasteful the 
task of singling out and killing the few 
who will die. Rising concerns about 
discrimination and arbitrariness - and 
growing uneasiness with the whole 
process - in turn, generate new doubts, 
new procedures, and new delays. 
MORE OF THE SAME 
At a glance, the death rows of America 
,seem headed for a massacre. As of April 
1993, there were 2,729 prisoners on death 
rows in the United States, and about 250 
new death sentences are meted out each 
year.19 Public support for the death penalty 
is intense, politicians fan the heat, and 
condemned prisoners pile up like dry 
brush. When Robert Alton Hams was put 
to death in April 1992, some observers 
speculated that the first execution in 
California in a quarter of a century would 
be the spark. 
This was hardly the first time that 
massive executions have been predicted. 
It hasn't happened. I do not think it will 
happen now either, although the rate of 
executions is likely to move up a notch 
from twenty or thirty a year to forty or 
conceivably fifty. That would be a change, 
but only in degree, not in kind. Even at 
fifty a year, executions would still the 
exception rather than the rule after a death 
sentence - and they would still be slow, 
costly and unpredictable. 
My basic argument why little is likely to 
change has two parts. 
First, support for the death penalty does 
not necessarily mean support for execu- 
tions. Public attitudes on criminal sentenc- 
ing are notoriously inconsistent. Several 
researchers have asked people about their 
attitudes toward perceived and actual 
sentences. The results show basic inconsis- 
tencies between what we say we want, and 
what we ourselves would actually do. In 
the context of the death penalty, many say 
they are for "mandatory" death sentences 
for certain crimes - killing a police 
officer, for example, or homicide in the 
course of a rape - but when gven an 
actual sentencing decision, choose life 
imprisonment as the correct penalty in just 
such a case.*%ugo Bedau has argued that 
many of those who say they favor capital 
punishment may want "only the legal threat 
of the death penalty, coupled with the 
judicial ritual of trylng, convicting, and 
occasionally sentencing a murderer to 
death, rather than achial esecutiolu."*' 
Some people, I expect, support capital 
punishment in order to keep every possible 
weapon in the public arsenal; others favor 
the death penalty (with or without execu- 
tions) simply because they do not believe 
that life imprisonment lasts for life.** 
Second, and more important, even those 
who do want executions do not want 
many. Many Americans, perhaps a 
majority, want some executions to take 
place as public statements about crime and 
murder, but there is widespread aversion 
to the prospect of numerow executions. 
A single execution is not truly an act of 
revenge but it looks like one; it syrnbohzes 
our desire and our willingness to seek 
vengeance. When we single out one 
murderer we can focus on what he did to 
deserve death. But if we were to conduct a 
hundred executions in close order, we 
would lose any illusion of individual 
vengeance; all we would see is mass 
slaughter by the state. The symbolism 
would change; the issue would now be the 
nature of our society, our culture. At a 
minimum, it would be a humhating 
comment on our failure to control violence 
by less bloody means; at worst it would 
provoke repulsive comparisons with Hitler 
and Stalin. 
In short, appearances to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the death penalty we 
have is pretty much the death penalty we 
want. The costs of the process are mostly 
hidden from view. Politicians and judges 
grumble about the delays, but the system 
does produce what the public demands: a 
widely available death penalty that is rarely 
carried out. 
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